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Crisis Governance in the Administrative State:
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008
Eric A. Posner* and Adrian Vermeule**
On September 11, 2001, a massive terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in
New York killed over 3,000 Americans. The markets plunged, and airline firms reeled
towards bankruptcy. Executive action and legislation followed, both to stabilize the
markets and to counter terrorism. One result was seven years of debate about inherent
executive power, the nature and quality of emergency lawmaking by Congress, and the
risks, benefits and harms of government action.
On September 18, 2008, after months of economic anxiety and several massive
bailouts of distressed firms by the government, the stock market had its largest single-day
drop since Sept. 11, 2001. Officials and commentators declared an economic emergency
and moved on two fronts. The Treasury and Federal Reserve dusted off a 1932 statute
and invoked the Fed’s authority to stabilize failing firms by lending them money,
although some were allowed to fail. Nearly simultaneously, Treasury proposed
emergency legislation granting the Secretary some $700 billion in spending authority to
buy mortgage-related assets, with open-ended administrative discretion. After the plan
was initially rejected by the House of Representatives, on September 29, the stock
markets fell even more sharply than on September 18. Amid great political controversy
and a mounting sense of crisis Congress passed a statute, the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 20081 (EESA), that not only approved the core of the Treasury’s
request but granted it additional powers, with qualifications and oversight mechanisms of
uncertain force and scope, and with many largely unrelated tax breaks thrown in to
sweeten the pill.
Of these two crises, one involved “security,” one involved “finance” or
“economics.” What are the similarities and differences? In positive terms, how did
legislators and executive officials behave, and how did the public and elites react?
Normatively, what do the two episodes show about the capacities of presidents,
bureaucrats, legislators and judges to manage crises in the administrative state, and the
rationality of their responses? And what of the legal issues common to both episodes,
such as the scope of inherent executive power and the limits of congressional delegation
– are the questions the same, and the answers?

*

Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Elisabeth Theodore for excellent
research assistance.
1
Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A (2008).
**

In what follows, we will argue that the two episodes were similar at the first
decimal place, but interestingly different at the second, and we will attempt to explain
both the similarities and differences. The first claim is that broad political processes and
constraints operated similarly in both episodes to create a generally similar pattern of
crisis governance and emergency lawmaking. In the modern administrative state, it is
practically inevitable that legislators, judges and the public will, indeed must, entrust the
executive branch with sweeping power to manage serious crises of this sort. Despite
traditional concerns about excessive delegation of power to the executive, who may
abuse that power or exploit it for unrelated ends, other actors have no real alternative in
such cases. Political conditions and constraints, including demands for swift action by an
aroused public, massive uncertainty, and awareness of their own ignorance, leave rational
legislators and judges no real choice but to hand the reins to the executive and hope for
the best. We will call this the “Schmittian view,” after the Weimar jurist Carl Schmitt,
and we will argue that it offers a better picture of the functioning of the administrative
state in crisis than the conventional “Madisonian view,” which holds that the executive
can act only after public debate and Congressional authorization or can, at most, take
interim emergency measures until Congress convenes.
The Schmittian view sets outer bounds on political behavior in crises, but does not
yield specific explanations of behavior within those bounds. Our second claim thus holds
that, within the broad constraints of crisis politics, Congress and the administration had
some freedom of action, and their actions differed in the two cases. Most notably, the
Bush administration asserted its authority more aggressively after 9/11 than in the
financial crisis. In the latter case it bowed to congressional supremacy and eschewed the
claims of inherent and exclusive constitutional power it had used to defy statutes in the
earlier episode. We argue that these variations in behavior within the constraints reflected
rational choices on all sides, given differences in the background political conditions of
2001 and 2008, particularly the Bush administration’s loss of popularity and credibility
over this period. We therefore reject competing explanations based on differences in the
applicable law, in crisis psychology, and other factors.
Part I describes each episode in turn, providing background, basic facts, and an
overview of the legal issues. Part II, focusing on the first-decimal similarities, outlines the
Schmittian view and suggests that it offers the best account of crisis management in the
administrative state. Part III focuses on the second-decimal differences and explains them
by reference to rational political behavior, given the actors’ preferences and political
circumstances. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Two Crises
A. 9/11 and Its Aftermath
Large libraries have been written about 9/11 and its political, economic and legal
consequences. We will offer a brief account that is unavoidably selective, picking out
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details that are useful for our later claims.2 In later sections, we offer a full treatment of
the financial crisis, whose origins, nature and legal implications are largely unexplored.
Economically, the immediate consequences of 9/11 were a massive drop in the
stock market, crippling losses in the airline and other transportation sectors, and
widespread uncertainty. The Bush administration and Congress responded with a law that
bailed out the airlines,3 and the economic issues temporarily receded from center stage.
Legally and politically, the main focus turned towards counterterror policies and, in 2003,
the war in Iraq, which the administration sometimes linked to the counterterror issue.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the legal framework for counterterrorism
policy came, for the most part, from the Constitution and from two major statutes: the
Authorization for Use of Military Force4 enacted on September 17, 2001, and the USA
PATRIOT Act,5 enacted on October 26, 2001. In subsequent years new statutes were
added, notably the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,6 the Military Commissions Act of
2006,7 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.8 For present purposes, we focus on the
AUMF and the Patriot Act, and their significance for theories of crisis management in the
administrative state.
In some cases, the Bush administration initiated or pursued post-9/11
counterterror policies based on claims of inherent executive power stemming from
Article II of the Constitution, particularly the Commander-in-Chief clause. In other cases,
however, the administration sought legislative authorization for its actions. The
September 14, 2001 AUMF gave the administration broad authority to use “necessary
and appropriate force” against Al Qaeda and related entities.9 How broad this authority
actually was became controversial in later years; a plurality of the Supreme Court
eventually ruled that it authorized executive detention of enemy combatants,10 yet in
controversies over surveillance the administration’s attempts to invoke the statute were
widely rejected.11
Civil-libertarian critics derided the “hasty” and “panicked” process by which the
AUMF and the Patriot Act were passed, and portrayed them as massive delegations of
unchecked power to the executive. The reality, however, was more complex. The
2

For a full treatment, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007).
3
See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
4
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
5
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
6
Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
7
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
8
Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
9
AUMF §2(b), 115 Stat. at 224.
10
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion).
11
See Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke University, et al.,
to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, United States Senate, et al. (Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-response.pdf.
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administration partially lost control of the legislative process in both cases, and although
it got most of what it wanted, it did not by any means get everything it asked for.
Measured from the baseline of the executive’s initial proposals, legislative pushback was
substantial. However, the larger picture shows a grain of truth in the critics’ complaints:
measured from the baseline of the legal status quo ante 9/11, the administration did
receive large delegations of new powers in response to the crisis.
What about the judges’ reaction? Here the picture fits a standard cyclical pattern
in American history: courts remain quiet during the first flush of an emergency, and then
reassert themselves, at least symbolically, as uncertainty fades and emotions cool.
Between 2001 and 2004, the courts were conspicuously silent about counterterror policy.
Indeed, in 2003 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case questioning the
constitutionality of closed hearings in deportation proceedings, despite the existence of a
circuit split on the issue12 – in tension with the Court’s usual certiorari practice, and a
clear example of Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues.”13
In 2004, the Court for the first time reached the merits of a case about presidential
authority over counterterror policy, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.14 Despite initial impressions
that the Court had asserted itself against executive power, the administration won most of
what it had wanted. Especially useful to the administration was the plurality’s holding
that the September 14, 2001 AUMF authorized detention of alleged enemy combatants.15
Newspaper accounts and civil libertarians focused on a different holding, that
constitutional due process might demand some minimum procedures to determine which
detainees are actually enemy combatants.16 However, the main opinion conspicuously
declined to require that judicial process be used,17 and the government constructed a
system of administrative tribunals to make enemy-combatant determinations.18
By 2006, the Bush administration had lost a great deal of credibility both at home
and (especially) abroad, in part because of setbacks in Iraq, in part because of scandals,
such as Abu Ghraib, and in part because of spectacular incompetence in the management
of Hurricane Katrina. Moreover, with the passage of time and the absence of new terrorist
attacks in the homeland, the sense of threat waned. Predictably, the judges reasserted
12

See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
1056 (2003).
13
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962).
14
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
15
See id. at 517.
16
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; Detainees; Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2004, at A1.
17
See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”).
18
See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy (July 7, 2004),
available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (establishing Combatant
Status Review Tribunals.)
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themselves. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, the Court held that the administration’s
military commissions set up to try alleged enemy combatants for war crimes violated
relevant statutes and treaties.19 When Congress reacted by passing the Military
Commissions Act in 2006, the Court went on to hold in 2008, in Boumediene v. Bush,
that the statute violated the Suspension Clause of the Constitution by denying habeas
corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.20 Even in these cases, however, the Court did
not actually order anyone released; in both cases, the result was simply more legal
process. There remain sharp pragmatic limits on what courts are willing to do when faced
with executive claims of security needs.
B. The Financial Crisis
1. The Origins of the Crisis
Financial crises are less familiar than security crises, and the September 2008
financial crisis has been less studied than the conflict with Al Qaida, so we will provide a
more detailed account of its background and development.
A financial crisis occurs when people stop extending credit to other people
because they fear that the loans will not be repaid. Modern financial regulation emerged
from the recognition that financial crises are inevitable in an unregulated market, and that
they can lead to economic collapse, political instability, and widespread misery. Consider
a typical bank. Banks are intermediaries that bring together creditors who have
accumulated capital and want to save it (depositors and other savers) and borrowers who
have insufficient capital for their purposes—consumers, who seek to purchase a durable
good which they will enjoy over a period of time, and businesses, which seek to make
investments. The bank takes funds from the creditors and extends them to the debtors,
making its profits by charging a higher interest rate to the debtors than it pays to the
creditors.
The bank attracts many of its creditors by giving them the right to withdraw their
funds on demand; it attracts many of its debtors by permitting them the right to pay back
over a long period of time. In normal times, creditors are constantly withdrawing and
depositing but in aggregate they leave a relatively fixed sum in the bank’s coffers, so that
the bank can turn it over to its long-term debtors without worrying that it will have to pay
more funds to its creditors than it has on hand. The bank will keep some funds on hand—
a capital cushion—to ensure that it can cover small withdrawal spikes. If some event—
say, the closure of a local factory—causes a temporary increase in withdrawals, the bank
can cover these withdrawals by borrowing from other banks with excess capital, while in
the meantime slowing down its long-term lending if there is a general economic
slowdown. The whole system works because depositors assume that banks will pay them

19
20

548 U.S. 557, (2006).
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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back if they withdraw their money, banks assume that they can borrow from other banks,
and so on.
A bank run occurs when depositors believe that the bank does not have enough
funds to pay them back. A run typically occurs as a result of some real or rumored event
that suggests that a bank may be, or become, insolvent. Suppose, for example, that people
believe that a bank manager has embezzled funds from the bank, depleting its assets. A
few risk-averse depositors withdraw their assets as a precaution, but when others hear
about these withdrawals, they fear that the bank will not have enough funds left to cover
their own withdrawals, and so forth, leading to a run. A run can be stopped if the bank
can borrow from other banks or institutions; as people realize that the bank will honor
their withdrawals, they feel less urgency about withdrawing. But if the rumored or real
events reflect a systemic problem—suppose people believe that there is an economic
downturn, which will lead to unemployment, which will lead to default by borrowers,
which will prevent banks from covering withdrawals—all banks will be subject to runs,
and so they will not be able to lend to each other. Indeed, banks may fear lending to a
particular bank that is subject to a run because they believe that that bank will still lose all
its depositors and thus be unable to repay the interbank loan. A collapse of banking can
ensue.
The main implication is that the financial system can collapse merely because of a
crisis of confidence, rather than because of some underlying economic problem. If
everyone believes that all banks will fail, and withdraws his or her deposits, then all
banks will fail. People put their money under their mattresses rather than in banks, which
means that banks have no money to lend to consumers and businesses. The businesses
cannot meet their payrolls and so must fire employees, who cannot repay their mortgages
or buy goods from other businesses, and so forth.
These problems were widely recognized long ago; the modern system of banking
regulation was finally put in place in the Great Depression, though it would continue to
evolve. Essentially, the government acts as the lender of last resort: it guarantees that
banks will have enough funds to cover deposits. This guarantee takes the form of deposit
insurance as well as a more informal commitment by the central bank, the Fed, to lend
money at low rates of interest to banks in financial distress. But the guarantee creates the
problem of moral hazard: because banks that make risky decisions know that the
government will rescue them if bad outcomes occur, while they enjoy the full payoff if
the decisions turn out well, they have an incentive to engage in those risky decisions. So
the government supervises banks; among other things, it requires them to maintain a
certain level of capital, so that they can cover withdrawals most of the time. Various
other restrictions have been imposed.21
21

For an overview of regulation of financial institutions, see HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS
JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1999).
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No one ever believed that the regulatory system was foolproof. Financial panics
happen as a result of complicated economic and psychological factors that are hard to
predict and control.22 The Fed and other government institutions must exercise judgment
when responding to them: if they are too aggressive, they exacerbate the problem of
moral hazard and can produce other adverse economic effects; if they are not aggressive
enough, financial crises will not be prevented or resolved. To some extent they are
inevitable, and the financial crisis of 2008 was surely due in part to factors that simply
cannot be controlled.
Otherwise, analysts identify a number of contributing factors to the 2008 crisis.23
Housing prices rose rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s, stimulated both by the rapid
economic growth of that period, which made people optimistic about their employment
prospects and future income, and by very risky lending to people without the financial
wherewithal to repay their loans unless housing prices would continue to rise indefinitely.
Thanks to innovations in the design of financial instruments, and to aggressive
government support for mortgage lending, lenders could lend money and then sell the
loan to others, who would bear the risk of nonpayment. The lenders thus had little
incentive to ensure that the borrower was not too risky, and in many instances engaged in
fraud to ensure that downstream buyers would believe that the borrower was less risky
than he or she in fact was. The loans were pooled and securitized, which means that the
streams of payments were divided up and packaged with other payment streams resulting
from other loans; people could trade these rights. Traders may not have worried much
about bad loans because they could diversify by purchasing different types of securities
(they were classified according to risk) and adding them to portfolios that included other
types of assets. And to the extent that traders did worry about the value of the mortgagebacked securities they held, they could reduce the risk they faced (or so they thought) by
engaging in credit default swaps, which were essentially insurance transactions, where a
third party would promise to pay the counterparty if the latter’s mortgage-back securities
lost value as a result of default on the underlying mortgages. These third parties would
charge premiums to cover the risk they were taking on, and employed sophisticated
trading strategies to minimize the risk that they took on—for example, short selling the
securities of other holders of the mortgage-backed securities as mortgage default rates
increased.

22

The economic literature contains two theories: one is that panics are random (see Douglas Diamond &
Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Liquidity, and Deposit Insurance, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983)); the other is
that they are due to asymmetric information (see Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of
Banking Panics: Models, Facts and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109
(R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1992)).
23
See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Three Trends And a Train Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at BU6 (“the three
fundamental factors behind the crisis have been new wealth, an added willingness to take risk and a
blindness to new forms of systematic risk”); Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis
Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (discussing various contributors).
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The securitization of mortgages was not a new phenomenon, and housing prices
had risen and fallen before. The magnitude of the financial crisis was probably due to the
trillion-plus dollar market in credit default swaps.24 Investment banks would buy pools of
mortgages and create instruments that gave buyers rights to various slices of the pooled
revenue streams—say, just the principal on a certain class of subprime mortgage, or just
the interest payments on another class of high-grade mortgage. Buyers of these
instruments may not have fully understood their riskiness or how to price them; even if
they did, many buyers had strong incentives to purchase them. An institution that
purchased these instruments could evade minimum capital requirements and add
enormous leverage to their portfolios, while regulators such as the SEC looked the other
way.25 This allowed them to make spectacular profits during boom times but threw them
into insolvency when the boom times ended.
Housing prices peaked in 2005-2006. The collapse that followed could well have
been a cyclical phenomenon—the standard bust that follows a boom when investors
overestimate the demand for a product and overbuild. But easy credit for home buyers
exacerbated the problem. As housing prices fell, mortgage holders found that they could
not avoid default by selling their houses, which were sold in foreclosure. As foreclosure
rates increased, the value of mortgage-backed securities fell. Investment banks that held
mortgage-related securities were required, by mark-to-market regulations, to lower the
value of these securities in their portfolios. As the value of their assets fell, these financial
institutions became insolvent. They had hedged the risk by purchasing derivatives but
these derivatives turned out to be worthless because counterparties also became insolvent.
Banks did not have to mark down their mortgage-related assets but by the same token
their own lenders could not price those assets, could not assume that the banks were
creditworthy, and thus became reluctant to lend to them. As is always the case in
financial crises, the government faced a dilemma. If it let firms fail, they would be
appropriately punished for their excessively risky investments. But they would also bring
down other firms, with the result that credit would dry up, and economic activity would
be stifled. After some hesitation—Lehman was allowed to fail with disastrous short-term
consequences because so many other firms had accounts with Lehman26—the Fed and
other government institutions began pumping liquidity into the system at unprecedented
levels. They were apparently persuaded by the scale of the failures, the quite obvious
24

See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358.pdf).
25
See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced, & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed in an §85 Billion
Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1; Floyd Norris, Out of the Shadows
and Into the Harsh Light, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at C3; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight
Flaws Fueled Collapse, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1.
26
See Floyd Norris, After Weekend Full of Talks, No Sign of a Lending Thaw, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008,
at B1; Louise Story & Ben White, The Road to Lehman's Failure Was Littered With Lost Chances, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B1; Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 2008, at A1.
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contagion effect, and independent evidence of a credit crunch, such as the extremely high
rate of interest that banks began to charge each other for interbank loans.
It soon became clear that a case-by-case approach would not be sufficient to
address the financial crisis. For one thing, the financial crisis would require more
resources than the Fed could supply. On September 19, Henry Paulson, the Treasury
Secretary, submitted a bill to Congress that would authorize Treasury to borrow $700
billion and use it to purchase mortgage-related assets. The bill provided that the
Secretary’s purchasing decisions would be final, not subject to judicial review. Paulson
apparently believed that by purchasing mortgage-related assets, the government would
help reduce uncertainty about banks’ balance sheets, allowing them to borrow if they
turned out to be solvent. Judicial review or other oversight would slow down this process
when quick action was essential.
The boldness of the Secretary’s bill initially produced an enthusiastic reaction,
and the financial markets rose, but quickly the reception turned sour. Critics argued that
the bill was a “blank check” that gave the Treasury too much discretion and subjected it
to too little oversight; that the bill favored the rich—the investment banks, their
managers, their shareholders—at the expense of the taxpayer, while providing no relief to
distressed homeowners; and that Secretary Paulson, with the support of Bernanke, sought
to stampede Congress into action by holding out dire consequences if inaction occurred,
rather than acknowledging that Congress should hold hearings, solicit the advice of
independent experts, and deliberate.27
House leaders of both parties, with the support of Paulson, President Bush, and
both candidates for the presidency, greatly expanded the Paulson bill, partly in response
to these criticisms, but on September 29, the House voted down the revised version by a
vote of 228 to 205. The stock market crashed, with the Dow Jones Index falling by 778
points. Senate leaders promptly took up the bill and overwhelmingly passed a revised
version on October 1. The Senate version largely retained the provisions of the House bill
but added numerous, mostly unrelated provisions designed to appeal to the marginal
dissenters. On October 3 this bill passed the House and was signed by the president.28
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200829 (EESA) differed from the
Paulson bill in numerous ways. But most important, for our purposes, it did not reduce
Treasury’s power to purchase mortgage-related securities; in fact, it expanded Treasury’s
27

See Letter from Professor Daron Acemoglu, et al., to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Sept. 24, 2008), available at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers/mortgage_protest.htm; see also David M.
Herszenhorn, Stephen Labaton, & Mark Landler, Democrats Set Conditions as Treasury Chief Rallies
Support for Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A1.
28
See David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1; Carl Hulse & Robert Pear,
Adding Sweeteners, Senate Pushes Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A1.
29
Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A [hereinafter “EESA”].
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power, authorizing it to purchase virtually any security when doing so could help resolve
the financial crisis.30 Democrats in Congress also sought to compel Treasury to regulate
executive compensation and provide relief to homeowners subject to foreclosure in
limited circumstances, but the authorities they gave Treasury were largely discretionary.
EESA also provided for limited judicial review and set up various oversight mechanisms
that, however, lacked coercive power.
Even before Treasury put into operation its plan to purchase mortgage-related
assets, it became clear that this approach would not be adequate, and Treasury announced
that it would inject equity directly into financial institutions by buying preferred stock, as
the Fed did with AIG. Meanwhile, the Fed was increasing the money supply, buying up
commercial paper, and purchasing other assets that it traditionally left to the private
markets. Treasury directed Fannie Mae and Sallie Mae to buy up mortgage-backed
securities. The FDIC was brokering purchases of failed banks such as Wachovia,31 and,
citing its emergency statutory authority, it eliminated the $250,000 ceiling on deposit
insurance and guaranteed virtually all newly issued senior unsecured debt, potentially
exposing itself to more than $1 trillion in liability.32
2. Legal Issues
Actions Based on Existing Statutory Authority. The EESA was proposed and
enacted in part to clarify the agencies’ statutory authority. Most of the actions taken by
the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and related agencies fit
within existing statutory authorities, but not all did. The most legally questionable event
was the bailout of AIG, which preceded the EESA’s passage.
AIG is the largest insurance company in the United States. When AIG was
required to mark down its mortgage-related assets, and to make good on its obligations
under its credit default swaps, it became insolvent. This meant that thousands of clients
who believed that they had insurance against various adverse events suddenly could not
expect to receive a full payout if those events occurred. Those clients would need to
either self-insure, by liquidating assets, or to purchase additional insurance, which would
also require liquidating assets, driving down their prices and contributing to the financial
contagion.33
The only way to stop financial contagions is to persuade creditors (the insurance
clients) that they will be paid in full. With respect to banks, the government guarantees
30

See id. §§ 3, 103.
Deborah Solomon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Bailout Plan Calms Markets, But Struggle Looms Over
Details, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, at A1; Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, Amid Global Worry,
Central Banks Try to Come to Credit Markets’ Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A1.
32
See FDIC, FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100.html.
33
See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced, & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed in an §85 Billion
Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.
31
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deposits, and the Fed can step in and make loans to banks threatened by runs, so that
creditors will not call in loans just because they fear similar action by other creditors. The
same logic applies to an insurance company, and the Fed could, in principle, rescue AIG
by making loans to it. The problem raised by the AIG case is that AIG was not a bank.
The Fed normally lends to banks and not to other institutions.
However, a Depression-era statute gave the Fed the power to make loans to nonbanks in emergency conditions.34 Citing this authority, the Fed made what it called a
secured loan to AIG.35 Under the terms of this transaction, AIG would borrow $85 billion
over two years, at the rate of three-month LIBOR (the interest rate charged on interbank
loans, which was three percent at the time of the transaction) plus 8.5 percent. All of
AIG’s assets provided collateral for the loan; and the U.S. Treasury would end up the
beneficiary of a trust holding 79.9 percent of AIG’s stock. Finally, the Fed replaced
AIG’s CEO and obtained undisclosed rights to control the operation of the business.36
Although a loan in form, the transaction was a purchase in substance: the Fed was
given the incidents of ownership in the form of most of the stock. If the transaction was
in substance a purchase of AIG, then it was not authorized by the statute, which permitted
only loans. A complicating factor is that under the Chevron doctrine, courts generally
defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutes they administer, at least if those
interpretations are issued in a procedurally proper format.37 A court might find that, in the
circumstances, the Fed’s implicit interpretation of the statute to permit purchases of
distressed non-bank firms in emergency conditions was reasonable.
The Nondelegation Doctrine and Nondelegation Canons. An even larger
complicating factor, both in the AIG case and in the case of the EESA, involves the
“nondelegation doctrine.” The doctrine holds that Congress must supply an intelligible
principle to guide the policymaking discretion of agencies. Failing this, Congress has
entrusted the agencies with legislative rather than executive power, in violation of Article
I.38 In practice, the nondelegation doctrine is largely moribund at the level of
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constitutional law; it was invoked to invalidate legislation for the first time in 1935, and
for the last time in 1936.39 At the level of statutory interpretation, however, the doctrine is
occasionally invoked as an interpretive canon, in which agency authority is construed
narrowly in order to avoid the constitutional question of nondelegation.40
Treasury’s initial proposal would have granted the Secretary sweeping authority
largely without explicit standards and without any judicial review. The final version of
the EESA actually expanded the Secretary’s authority along important margins, although
it also introduced some oversight mechanisms and some judicial review, as we will
discuss below. Given the breadth of authority it delegates, a colorable nondelegation
challenge might be made against the EESA. A challenge of that sort might emphasize
that, when the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935, it
described the statute as granting the President power over the entire national economy,
essentially enabling an economic dictatorship.41 Perhaps the EESA is not entirely
dissimilar, at least in the sense that the EESA will affect the entire economy, directly or
indirectly, and that the power to spend $700 billion or more42 represents a large-ish chunk
of money and discretionary authority for any one administrator to possess. Furthermore,
the Court’s last major pronouncement on the constitutional nondelegation doctrine,
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,43 articulated a sliding-scale approach,
under which a delegation conferring greater discretion requires more clarity and
specificity in its guiding principles.44
For several reasons, however, such a challenge is highly unlikely to succeed.
First, the enacted statute contains more in the way of explicit intelligible principles and
standards than did the initial proposal. The main purpose is to “immediately provide
authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and
stability to the financial system of the United States.”45 Whether or not the grant of such
authority or its exercise will have those effects, the statute’s purpose is perfectly
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intelligible. And the statute contains an explicit list of rather detailed “considerations”
that the Secretary must take into account when exercising his authority.46
Second, courts have sometimes read legislation to contain implicit standards,
drawn from the legislative background and statutory purposes, in order to pretermit a
nondelegation challenge,47 and that course of action would seem highly probable with
respect to the EESA, even if the statute’s explicit standards are insufficient. Courts might
read the legislation to implicitly embody a general intelligible principle that the
Secretary’s powers is to be used in order to promote liquidity, to raise confidence, to
dampen uncertainty, to stabilize markets, or some mix of all of these. The legislative
history is of course extremely thin, as is usually the case with emergency statutes, but the
broader legislative background contains ample references to these and related ideas.
Third, any of these standards and principles would make the EESA at least as
intelligible as other statutes the Court has upheld against nondelegation challenge. These
include statutes giving agencies power to regulate “in the public interest” and, most
recently, in Whitman, a statute giving EPA the authority to regulate pollutants in a
manner “requisite to protect the public health.”48 If such precedents are any guide, it is
unlikely in the extreme that the Court would invalidate the EESA on nondelegation
grounds.
That said, the nondelegation canon might be invoked at the level of statutory
interpretation. In the case of the EESA the Treasury’s substantive authority is quite clear,
so the more likely use of the nondelegation canon would be to narrow the Fed’s authority
under the 1932 statute used to “loan” money to AIG. In recent cases, the Court has
refused to construe ambiguous statutes, and even not-so-ambiguous statutes, to give
agencies discretion over “major questions” of policy49; a clear statement from Congress is
said to be necessary in such circumstances. Indeed, is possible that lingering concerns
over the legal status of the AIG bailout, for which statutory authority was somewhat
ambiguous, were part of the impetus for the EESA. The statute gives the Treasury clear
authority to make purchases from distressed firms, whereas the Fed has such authority
only under a flexible reading of the 1932 law.
Judicial Review. The Secretary’s initial proposal would have precluded any
judicial review of his discretionary decisions under the statute. Lawyers and others
reacted by saying that the preclusion would give the Secretary unchecked power; they
meant power with no legal checks, although political checks would continue to operate.
In response, the enacted version of the legislation provided for standard APA-style
46
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arbitrariness review. However, in an example of “studied ambiguity”50 or simply out of
haste, the statute also prohibited injunctions or other equitable relief against the
Secretary’s actions under some of the main provisions of the Act, despite the fact that
APA-style review is itself equitable.51 A plausible reconciliation of these provisions is
that Congress merely intended to bar parties from obtaining advance relief against the
Secretary’s decisions, while still allowing parties to obtain relief after the fact, but this is
hardly pellucid.
So the judicial review provisions of the EESA are confusing, but it is clear that
the statute provides for more than zero judicial review, in contrast to the initial proposal.
For present purposes, the availability of at least some review has a double significance.
First, there is the question how much judicial oversight the review provisions will enable,
in practice; we take up that issue in Part II, suggesting that judicial review under the
EESA will quite predictably prove highly deferential.
Second, the availability, or not, of judicial review might be a factor in the
nondelegation analysis. At least on an older view, judicial review helps to ensure against
arbitrary administrative action and thereby substitutes for legislative oversight.52 The
absence of review would exacerbate any nondelegation problems, but the availability of
review under the actual legislation would be yet another reason for thinking that a
constitutional nondelegation challenge would make little headway. However, all this may
be a red herring in any event. A view with more recent support is that nondelegation is
strictly a question about whether the relevant statute creates a substantive intelligible
principle to guide the executive; judicial review is a separate question, one that is neither
here nor there. Although the latter view is implicitly suggested by the logic of Whitman
v. American Trucking, the Court has not issued a clear statement about the question.53
II. Crisis Management in the Administrative State: A Schmittian View
Against this legal and economic background, what explains how institutions and
actors behaved? Many discussions of crisis management and emergency lawmaking have
two main flaws. First, they focus on historical episodes from the Civil War or earlier,
overlooking that the central problems of crisis management today involve the role of the
administrative state. By contrast, we will focus on a nearly synchronic comparison
between the 9/11 crisis and its aftermath, on the one hand, and the 2008 financial crisis,
on the other. In both episodes, administrative agencies have been central actors.
50

Cf. Posting of Rick Pildes to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/09/update-revising-powersof-secretary-of.html (Sept. 28, 2008, 17:14 EST).
51
See EESA § 119(a)(2).
52
See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 746.
53
Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (three-judge court), cert.
denied, 128 S.Ct. 2962 (2008), which upheld, against a nondelegation challenge, a statute giving the
Secretary of Homeland Security unreviewable authority to waive multiple federal statutes in order to speed
up the building of a fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.

15

Secondly, even discussions that do take account of the administrative state tend to
ignore political constraints. They ask how authority to manage crises should be allocated
among Congress, the President, executive agencies, independent agencies, and the courts,
as though all possible choices are on the table and everything is up for grabs. We will
suggest, to the contrary, that the beginning of wisdom on this subject is to recognize the
tight constraints that the possible places on the desirable. Ought implies can; before
asking what authority institutions ought to have to manage crises, we must ask what their
capacities are, and what allocations of authority are feasible given those capacities.
This sort of analysis will have indirect normative implications, but largely
negative ones. In this Part, we will argue that the conditions of the administrative state
make it practically inevitable that the executive and the agencies will be the main crisis
managers, with legislatures and courts reduced to adjusting the government’s response at
the margins and carping from the sidelines. Congress and the courts suffer from crippling
institutional debilities as crisis managers; legislators and judges are aware of this, and do
what they have no real choice but to do, which is delegate sweeping power to the
executive to cope with the crisis. In Part III, we will go on to explain how officials
behaved, within the broad constraints we have identified. In particular, we ask whether
officials acted irrationally in these episodes, given their political circumstances; our
answer is no.
A. Common Features
The preconditions for both crises developed through the ordinary workings of
history, well before the crises burst onto the scene. The 9/11 security crisis can be traced
to the 1991 Gulf War, when Saudi Arabia turned down Osama bin Laden’s offer of
protection from Iraq, which had just invaded Kuwait, and accepted American protection;
other complex foreign policy decisions related to the United State’s engagement in the
middle east also contributed to the conflict with Al Qaida. The 2008 financial crisis also
has nearer and more distant origins. The vulnerability of the financial system to the
housing bubble had a tangle of causes, including deregulation and lax oversight going
back to the 1990s, the globalization of the financial system as a result of technological
innovation, and the invention of sophisticated financial instruments that allowed investors
to spread their risks but that also had the effect of increasing systemic risk.
In both cases, the crisis began when events—the 9/11 attack, the failure of
numerous large financial institutions in a short time period—revealed the existence of a
serious threat to security in one case and to economic well-being in the other.
Government officials and private observers had for a long time understood that Al Qaida
could launch a devastating terrorist attack and that turmoil in the housing and subprime
mortgage markets could lead to a financial meltdown, but the dangers in both cases were
highly uncertain, and elected officials could not be persuaded to devote significant
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resources to these problems.54 The crisis revealed the extent of the danger and the
executive branch responded with alacrity.
In both cases, at the onset of the crisis the executive acted immediately and
sought authorization from Congress. In the 9/11 crisis, the Bush administration shut down
air travel, directed security personnel to guard against further attacks, swept up thousands
of undocumented aliens from Muslim countries, and engaged in ethnic profiling.
Meanwhile, it went to Congress and obtained a very broad delegation—the Authorization
to Use Military Force—which would allow it to engage in combat operations against
suspected members of Al Qaida and affiliated groups around the world, and to launch an
invasion of Afghanistan. It also submitted the Patriot Act to Congress, which would give
law enforcement officials various search and surveillance tools. Notably, the Bush
administration also defied several existing statutory schemes rather than seeking to have
them changed: the ban on torture, restrictions on surveillance in FISA, and (arguably) a
law against detention of U.S. citizens.
In the financial crisis, the Bush administration—including the Federal Reserve
Board, a legally independent agency that acted in close collaboration with the Treasury—
also relied heavily on statutory authorities. The bailouts of Fannie Mae, Sallie Mae, Bear
Stearns, and AIG were conducted pursuant to statutes that authorize the Fed to make
loans to banks and, in emergencies, other businesses whose failure threatens the health of
the financial system. But the Bush administration also submitted a bill to Congress that
would give Treasury power to purchase mortgage-related assets from distressed firms,
including the authority to spend up to $700 billion for this purpose. Congress initially
rejected the bill, but a modified version that gave Treasury more power than it initially
sought, albeit subject to greater oversight as well, was enacted only two weeks after the
Bush administration’s proposal was sent to Congress.
Overall, the politics of the two crises had four major features in common. First, a
publicly observable event occurred. In 2001, four planes were hijacked, and three crashed
into buildings, killing more than 3,000 people. In 2008, highly visible financial
institutions with household names collapsed or teetered on the abyss, the stock market
plunged, and various indicators of the ill health of credit markets reached unprecedented
levels.55 Second, the events revealed a threat about which ordinary people and many
experts previously knew little or nothing. The visibility of the threat confirmed, for
ordinary people, the nature of the threat to which experts testified. Third, the threat
54
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revealed by the crisis was complex and ambiguous, and the proper response to the threat
was highly uncertain. Only experts could really understand the threat—perhaps only
experts with security clearances or access to privileged information. However, the experts
disagreed among themselves and could not adequately explain their views to the public or
even to politicians. Fourth, and related, a general view emerged that the executive needed
additional discretion (as well as resources) in order to address the threat adequately. This
view held that Congress must grant new authority or relax existing constraints on
executive action. And Congress did in fact do so, delegating sweeping new powers to the
executive, although with some qualifications at the margin and with oversight
mechanisms of uncertain force.
B. The Schmittian View
Why do crises pose distinctive problems for democratic governance? One might
deny that they do. On this view, crises do not belong in a category of their own; they are
just the endpoint of a continuum along which the magnitude of a threat increases.
Ordinary criminal behavior can have devastating effects but no one believes that its
existence creates a crisis. Police, prosecutors, and other executive officials are given
some discretion, but their statutory authority is circumscribed and their decisions are
subjected to ordinary judicial review. The emergence of a terrorist threat is, like the crack
epidemic, just a new type of criminal problem, necessitating perhaps increased resources
for the police and the construction of prisons, but not any significant change in how the
legal system operates.
Similarly, one might point out that the economy always experiences “too much”
or “too little” lending, against some baseline of optimal social welfare. Institutions are set
up to inject and extract liquidity as circumstances warrant, and to ensure that creditors
and debtors do not exploit these types of government intervention in a manner that harms
public welfare. A financial crisis is just the extreme end of a continuum of liquidity,
requiring perhaps greater resources but no real change in the operation of institutions.
Whatever the merits of that view, this is not what happens during crises. Instead,
fundamental institutional reform takes place in a brief period of time even as existing
institutions struggle to fulfill their mandate. Sometimes, existing institutions simply claim
more power than it was understood that they had. At other times, Congress rouses itself
to act, but only for the purpose of confirming a seizure of power or discretion by the
executive, or in order to delegate large new powers. Our goal is to understand these
dynamics.
To do so, we turn to the best general analysis of institutional capacities and crisis
management in the administrative state, stemming from Carl Schmitt. A main theme in
Schmitt’s work involves the relationship between the classical rule-of-law state, featuring
legislative enactment of general rules enforced by courts, and the administrative state,
featuring discretionary authority and ad hoc programs, administered by the executive,
18

affecting particular individuals and firms. We do not need, and will dispense with, some
of Schmitt’s more jurisprudential and abstract claims and concerns, such as his critique of
legal positivism. Rendered in suitably pragmatic terms, Schmitt’s work contains essential
insights for understanding how Congress, the courts and the executive can and cannot
manage crises, economic or otherwise.
Here the main inspiration is not solely Schmitt’s famous work on emergencies, on
“the exception” as opposed to normal law, or his famous pronouncement that “sovereign
is he who decides on the exception.”56 Although we will draw on those themes when
relevant, we also draw on Schmitt’s analysis of the general debility of legislatures and
judges in the modern administrative state, not only in times of war but also or especially
in economic crises.57 Such crises underscore legislative debility, making it plain for all to
observe, but the causes of the debility are structural.
The nub of Schmitt’s view is his idea that liberal lawmaking institutions, such as
legislatures and courts, “come too late” to crises in the modern state. Those institutions
frame general norms that are essentially “oriented to the past,” whereas “the dictates of
modern interventionist politics cry out for a legal system conducive to a present- and
future-oriented steering of complex, ever-changing economic scenarios.”58 Legislatures
and courts, then, are continually behind the pace of events in the administrative state;
they play an essentially reactive and marginal role.
Legislatures may be asked to delegate new authority to administrators after a
crisis is already underway, but the frontline response is inevitably administrative, and the
posture in which legislators are asked typically to grant new delegations of authority,
with the crisis looming or in full blast, all but ensures that legislators will give the
executive much of what it asks for. Courts, for their part, get involved only much later, if
at all, and essentially do mop-up work after the main administrative programs and
responses have solved the crisis, or not. The result is that in the administrative state,
broad delegations to executive organs will combine lawmaking powers with
administrative powers; “only then can the temporal distance between legislation and legal
application be reduced[.]”59
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These points are abstract. We illustrate them by examining the role of Congress in
the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis. Our main claim will be that the
Schmittian view supplies a better account of Congress’ behavior in these crisis episodes
than do competing views.
C. Congress
Madisonians describe Congress as the deliberative institution par excellence. On
this view, Congress is a summation of local majorities, bringing local information and
diverse perspectives to national issues. The bicameral structure of Congress aids
deliberation; the House shifts rapidly in response to changing conditions and national
moods, while the Senate provides a long-term perspective, and cools off overheated or
panicky legislation.
It is unclear whether the Madisonian account is best taken to describe
congressional action in normal times, in times of (perceived) crisis, or both, although the
Madisonian emphasis on the cooling-off function of the Senate is clearly intended as a
check on executive claims that an emergency is at hand. Whatever the case, the
application of the Madisonian view to crises or emergencies is the default position among
legal academics. On this view, even in crisis situations the executive may act only on the
basis of clear congressional authorization that follows public deliberation, and the
executive’s actions must presumptively be subject to judicial review. A proviso to the
Madisonian view is that if immediate action is literally necessary, the executive may act,
but only until Congress can convene to deliberate; if the executive’s interim actions were
illegal, it must seek ratification from Congress and the public after the fact.60 In our view,
by contrast, if we take current institutions as they are – thereby bracketing proposals for
either large-scale constitutional reform61 or for small-scale, feasible improvements to
Congress’ design and procedures62 – the Madisonian vision of Congress seems
hopelessly optimistic in times of crisis.
On Schmitt’s view, the deliberative aspirations of classical parliamentary
democracy have become a transparent sham under modern conditions of party discipline,
60
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interest-group conflict and a rapidly changing economic and technical environment.
Rather than deliberate, legislators bargain, largely along partisan lines. Discussion on the
legislative floor, if it even occurs, is carefully orchestrated posturing for public
consumption, while the real work goes on behind closed doors, in party caucuses.
How does this picture relate to Schmitt’s point that legislatures invariably “come
too late” to a crisis? The basic dilemma, for legislatures, is that before a crisis they lack
the motivation and information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has
occurred, they have no capacity to manage it themselves. We will describe each horn of
the dilemma in detail.
In the pre-crisis state, legislatures mired in partisan conflict about ordinary
politics lack the motivation to address long-term problems. Legislation at this point
would act from behind a veil of uncertainty about the future, and might thus prove
relatively impartial; at least high uncertainty would obscure the distributive effects of the
legislation for the future, and thus reduce partisan opposition. However, by virtue of these
very facts, there is no strong partisan support for the legislation, and no bloc of legislators
has powerful incentives to push it onto the crowded legislative agenda. The very
impartiality that makes ex ante legislation relatively attractive, from a Madisonian
perspective, also reduces the motivation to enact it.
This point is entirely independent of Schmitt’s claim about the norm and the
exception. In a modern rendition, that claim holds that ex ante legal rules cannot regulate
crises in advance, because unanticipated events will invariably arise. Legislatures
therefore either decline to regulate in advance or enact emergency statutes with vague
standards that defy judicial enforcement ex post.63 Here, however, a different point is at
issue: even if ex ante legal rules could perfectly anticipate all future events, legislatures
will often lack the incentive to adopt them in advance. Occasionally, when a high-water
mark of public outrage against the executive is reached, legislatures do adopt framework
statutes that attempt to regulate executive behavior ex ante; several statutes of this kind
were adopted after Watergate. The problem is that new presidents arrive, the political
coalitions that produced the framework statute come apart as new issues emerge, and
public outrage against executive abuses cools. Congress soon relapses into passivity and
cannot sustain the will to enforce, ex post, the rules set out in the framework statutes. The
post-Watergate framework statutes have thus, for the most part, proven to impose little
constraint on executive action in crisis, in large part because Congress lacks the
motivation to enforce them.64
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The other horn of the dilemma arises after the crisis has begun to unfold. Because
of their numerous memberships, elaborate procedures and internal structures, such as
bicameralism and the committee system, legislatures can rarely act swiftly and decisively
as events unfold. The very complexity and diversity that make legislatures the best
deliberators, from a Madisonian perspective, also raise the opportunity costs of
deliberation during crises and disable legislatures from decisively managing rapidly
changing conditions. After 9/11, everyone realized that another attack might be
imminent; only an immediate, massive response could forestall it. In September 2008, the
financial markets needed immediate reassurance: only credible announcements from
government agencies that they would provide massive liquidity could supply such
reassurance. Indeed, though commentators unanimously urged Congress to take its time
with the Paulson plan,65 within weeks the Bush administration was being criticized for
not acting quickly enough. In such circumstances, legislatures are constrained to a
reactive role, at most modifying the executive’s response at the margins, but not
themselves making basic policy choices.
The main implication of this dilemma is that crises in the administrative state tend
to follow a similar pattern. In the first stage, there is an unanticipated event requiring
immediate action. Executive and administrative officials will necessarily take
responsibility for the front-line response; typically, when asked to cite their legal
authority for doing so, they will either resort to vague claims of inherent power or will
offer creative readings of old statutes. Because legislatures come too late to the scene, old
statutes enacted in different circumstances, and for different reasons, are typically all that
administrators have to work with in the initial stages of a crisis. “Over time, the size and
complexity of the economy will outgrow the sophistication of static financial safety
buffers”66—a comment that can also be made about static security safety buffers, which
the advance of weapons technology renders obsolete. In this sense, administrators also
“come too late” – they are forced to “base decisions about the complex, ever-changing
dynamics of contemporary economic [and, we add, security] conditions on legal relics
from an oftentimes distant past.”67
Thus Franklin Roosevelt regulated banks, in 1933, by offering a creative reading
of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, a statute that needless to say was enacted
with different problems in mind.68 Likewise, when in 2008 it became apparent on short
notice that the insurance giant AIG had to be bailed out, lest a systemwide meltdown
occur, the Treasury and Federal Reserve had to proceed through a strained reading of a
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hoary 1932 statute, as we discussed in Part I. While the statute authorized “loans,” it did
not authorize government to purchase private firms; administrators structured a
transaction that in effect accomplished a purchase in the form of a loan. The pattern holds
for security matters as well as economic issues, and for issues at the intersection of the
two domains. Thus after 9/11, the Bush administration’s attempts to choke off Al
Qaeda’s funding initially proceeded in part under provisions of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act,69 a 1977 statute whose purpose, when enacted, was
actually to restrict the President’s power to seize property in times of crisis.70
Crisis and delegation.71 In the second stage, Congress writes new statutes
delegating broad powers to the executive to handle the crisis. It is simplistic to say, and
we do not claim, that legislatures write the executive a blank check. On the other hand, it
is equally false to say that during crises, Congress acts as a Madisonian deliberator, with
institutions like bicameralism cooling of the heated passions of the public and of
executive officials. The basic pattern is that the executive asks to take three steps
forward; Congress, pushing back somewhat, has no choice but to allow it to take two. We
will examine both parts of this pattern.
After the initial wave of strictly administrative response based on old statutes or
vague claims of inherent authority, the executive asks Congress to delegate new powers.
Executive proposals are typically sweeping, perhaps because the executive has private
information about the magnitude of the crisis that it cannot fully convey to Congress, or
because the executive uses the crisis as an opportunity to enlarge its power, or because
the executive, anticipating a bargaining game with senior legislators, stakes out an
extreme position – perhaps more extreme than the executive itself actually desires – so as
to be well-positioned to make concessions.
Once the proposal is submitted to Congress, bargaining results, perhaps on a very
compressed time-table. Large delegations are usually enacted quickly, and critics tend to
complain of hasty or panicked lawmaking, although the critics often overlook the
opportunity costs of deliberation, which rise in times of crisis.72 Here, suffice it to say
that the speed of legislative enactment in such cases does not at all mean that the
executive gets whatever it wants. What matters in (legislative) bargaining is not the
parties’ absolute haste, but their relative impatience. If the executive is even more
impatient to enjoy the fruits of agreement than are legislators, or even more fearful of the
consequences of nonagreement, then the executive will tend to make some concessions.
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Executives might be relatively more impatient than legislators because they need to show
decisive leadership, because the public will hold them responsible for disasters,
regardless of the legal situation, or because the political costs of bargaining failure are
spread over many legislators, while executive officials each incur a large share of
opprobrium.
All of these dynamics were on display in the bargaining over the AUMF, over the
Patriot Act, and over the EESA. In the first case, the White House initially proposed a
blank-check delegation to the President of power to respond as appropriate to “deter and
preempt terrorism.”73 The bargaining, although accomplished in a matter of days, ended
up introducing a more restrictive nexus test, which limited the President’s authority to the
use of force against entities that had aided the 9/11 attacks.74 In the case of the Patriot
Act, a rebellion by civil-libertarian Republican legislators in the House caused the
administration to temporarily lose control of the bargaining process, resulting in a
reduced grant of powers combined with a sunset provision.75
In the case of the EESA, the administration’s initial plan was sketchy in the
extreme, and would have granted legally unreviewable power to the Secretary of the
Treasury to spend some $700 billion dollars on the acquisition of mortgage-related assets,
essentially without legislative standards. Rebellious House Republicans rejected one
version of the bill, but the final legislation retained the core of the administration’s
proposal, while modifying it on several margins. The statute actually gave the Secretary
additional new powers that the administration had not requested or perhaps even desired,
such as the powers to buy an equity stake in distressed firms and to regulate executive
pay. The former power would allow the Treasury to “nationalize” banks—that is, take
them over and operate them. On the other hand, several oversight mechanisms were
introduced, although as we will discuss shortly, their effectiveness is questionable.
Finally, the legislation introduced some new substantive restrictions on the Secretary’s
new authority, and provided for staggered disbursement of the funds in a fashion
reminiscent of the Patriot Act’s sunset provisions.
In all these cases, the approximate result was the same. Measured either from the
baseline of (1) what the executive initially requested or (2) what the executive actually
desired (as best we can tell from indirect evidence), Congress pushed back substantially,
despite the speed of legislative enactment; it narrowed proposed delegations or added
delegations that the administration did not desire, added sunset provisions or similar
mechanisms, and created oversight mechanisms. These points should not obscure,
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however, that measured from the baseline of (3) the legal status quo ante the emergency,
executives obtained broad new delegations of power. After the AUMF, the President
possessed a great deal of statutory authority to combat terrorism, especially abroad; after
the Patriot Act, that authority was extended to domestic criminal law and immigration
matters; after the EESA, the President enjoyed broad statutory authority to rescue the
economy from crisis.
The upshot is that in cases of emergency lawmaking, Congress lets the executive
have most, although not all, of what it wants. Legislators have no real choice but to do so.
In perceived crises, the status quo is unacceptable, but the costs and benefits of the
alternatives to the status quo are highly uncertain; indeed the alternatives themselves are
usually ill-defined. Congress’ usual built-in advantage – inertia, or the ability of
legislative leaders and interest groups to kill proposals at vetogates and thereby do
nothing at all – is ruled out by politics. Congress can modify and push back to a degree,
but the public, motivated by some mix of fear, urgency, and rational apprehension,
demands that something be done.
In this situation, the executive has enormous inherent advantages. Where inaction
is not an option, the executive’s proposal is a natural focal point. The ability to move first
by framing a proposal and putting it on the congressional agenda determines the contours
of the subsequent bargaining game, even if Congress modifies the executive’s proposal
substantially. Legislators may be frustrated with the thrust of the executive’s proposal,
not merely the details, but be unable to find an alternative, or unable to force public
attention onto their preferred alternative, out of the welter of suggestions and
possibilities. Either where there are no alternatives or where there are too many, the
executive’s proposal will stand out.
Perhaps most of all, key legislators fear being stamped as obstructionists who
have prevented the executive from taking necessary measures. The very nature of crisis
bargaining implies that legislative leaders will become especially visible – there is no
time for wide consultation of the rank-and-file – so the leaders’ potential responsibility is
heightened. Furthermore, legislative leaders can do something to focus public attention
on back-benchers who threaten to scuttle a deal. In 2008, when the EESA came up for a
second (and presumably final) vote in the House, leaders trumpeted to the public that
everything depended on whether House Republican back-benchers would go along76 –
leaving the latter in the uncomfortable position of being the last obstacle to the
emergency measures.
As we have mentioned, these effects are somewhat diluted because blame can be
spread over a collective legislature, ensuring that individuals have reduced responsibility.
Thus when the first version of the EESA was voted down in the House, one Republican
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legislator remarked that the first choice of his colleagues was to have the bill pass while
voting against it.77 The problem, as the event showed, was that because too many
legislators acted on this preference, the bill did not pass at all. Ultimately, how these
opposing forces working for and against broad delegation net out in particular cases of
emergency lawmaking cannot be settled in the abstract, but only by looking at a series of
cases. The pattern of recent history is clear enough: although legislators do push back
against executive demands, in the end they accede to the core of the executive’s
proposals, both as to security matters and financial ones.
These causal claims about the politics of emergency lawmaking do not imply that
legislators delegate “too much” power in crises. A hypothetical rational legislator, given
emergency conditions, might delegate the same amount of power as an actual legislator
buffeted by emotions and political winds. In Part III, we take up the question of the
rationality of emergency delegations. Here, we merely note that political forces make
large-scale delegation all but inevitable in such cases, although it is also true that the
executive never gets all that it asks for or even all that it wants.
The irrelevance of divided government. How important is divided government in
crisis bargaining over delegation? Whatever the importance of divided government in
normal times,78 the partisan composition of Congress and the executive is of reduced
importance in emergencies, or so the evidence suggests. In the bargaining over the Patriot
Act, the administration lost control of Republican back-benchers in the House, who were
concerned about civil liberties. In the bargaining over the EESA in September 2008, the
administration lost control of Republican back-benchers in the House, who were
concerned about “socialism” and the encroachment of government on the free market. In
the first case, the Republicans held a majority, in the second they were in the minority.
However, the second defection was as consequential as the first, because in 2008 the
Democratic majority in the House was reluctant to enact the bill without the political
cover provided by the support of the Republican minority. In effect, the minority party
held a veto over the enactment; nominally divided government was effectively
consensual government.
These two episodes illustrate several mechanisms that reduce the significance of
divided government during emergency lawmaking. First, both the public and officialdom
may experience emotions of genuine solidarity during a crisis, especially in its initial
stages. A marker of such solidarity is that legislators transcend partisanship, at least
temporarily. Second, even when the emotion of solidarity gets no purchase among
hardened officials, public demand for bipartisanship in times of crisis can induce ersatz
solidarity; fearing that the public will punish any actor who resorts to the open
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partisanship of normal times, legislators will grit their teeth and behave as though
motivated by impartial concern for the public interest. Finally, emergencies often
implicate new policy issues and unforeseen questions of institutional authority, both of
which tend to cut across frozen partisan cleavages. In the case of the Patriot Act and the
EESA, fears about civil liberties and economic liberties, or creeping “socialism,” were
both held by conservative Republicans in the House, while the Republican administration
took an authoritarian stance on both security issues and economic issues. In those cases
and also in the case of the September 2001 AUMF, there was evidence of bipartisan
concern that an excessively broad delegation would overturn the allocation of lawmaking
power among the branches. Although the latter concern was not sufficiently powerful to
overcome the political forces favoring broad delegation, it did cause a degree of pushback
against executive proposals.
Schmitt vs. Madison redux. The overall picture of Congress’ role in emergency
lawmaking, then, is as follows. Congress lacks motivation to act before the crisis, even if
the crisis is in some sense predictable. Thus the initial administrative response will
inevitably take place under old statutes of dubious relevance, or under vague emergency
statutes that imposes guidelines that the executive ignores and that Congress lacks the
political will to enforce,79 or under claims of inherent executive authority. After the crisis
is underway, the executive seeks a massive new delegation of authority and almost
always obtains some or most of what it seeks, although with modifications of form and of
degree. When Congress enacts such delegations, it is reacting to the crisis rather than
anticipating it, and the consequence of delegation is just that the executive once again
chooses the bulk of new policies for managing the crisis, but with clear statutory
authority for doing so.
In this pattern, Congress’s structural incapacities ensure that, while Congress can
shape and constrain the executive’s response at the margins, it is fundamentally driven by
events and by executive proposals for coping with those events, rather than seizing
control of them. Schmitt’s broad claim that the fast-moving conditions of the
administrative state produce a marginal, reactive, and essentially debilitated Congress,
whether or not true in normal times, is basically accurate during crises. At a minimum, it
is closer to the mark than the Madisonian vision of a deliberative legislature that might
rise to the occasion in times of crises, rather than handing power to the executive and
hoping for the best.
The role of the Senate in the EESA’s passage is particularly hard to square with
the Madisonian view. Far from dampening hasty legislation with a calmly deliberative
perspective, the Senate played two main roles. The first, a pluralist role, was to lubricate
the bill’s passage with pork-fat, such as a tax break for producers of wooden arrows (but
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not plastic ones) intended to gain the support of the Senators from Oregon.80 The
Senate’s second role was to put pressure on the House to act even more quickly and to
approve the new delegation of executive authority. The Senate vote was accelerated by
Senate leaders in order to approve the bill before the House’s final vote, a move intended
to underscore the obstructionism of House Republicans and to raise the political costs of
their resistance.81 Rather than cooling off the sense of urgency behind the legislation, the
Senate helped bring it to a boil.
To be sure, it is difficult to extract from the Madisonian view clear implications or
predictions about how Congress will or should act during emergencies, in order to
compare with the facts. Both the Schmittian view and the Madisonian view offer broad
accounts of political processes and probabilistic tendencies, rather than point predictions.
The Schmittian view, however, could clearly be falsified by imaginable outcomes. If
Congress had rejected the bailout bill altogether, or decided to handle mortgage-related
purchases itself, through its committees – and a great many detailed policy choices and
appropriations matters were handled in exactly that way during the 19th century – then the
Schmittian view would have been falsified. If after 9/11 Congress had adopted a statute
that restricted the president’s power in future security emergencies,82 the Schmittian view
would have been falsified in the security context. By the same token, however, if we are
right that Congress played a marginal and reactive role during both crises, bucking
against executive proposals but eventually giving in, griping from the stands, and
reaching decisions mostly through bargaining rather than deliberation, it is fair to think
that the Madisonian view does not capture the dynamics of crisis governance.
D. The Courts
As we have addressed the role of the courts in security emergencies at length
elsewhere,83 and as courts have not yet made an appearance in the 2008 financial crisis,
we will offer a briefer account here of their role in economic crises. In either context,
courts are marginal participants. Here two Schmittian themes are relevant: that courts
come too late to the crisis to make a real difference in many cases, and that courts have
pragmatic and political incentives to defer to the executive, whatever the nominal
standard of review. The largest problem, underlying these mechanisms, is that courts
possess legal authority but not robust political legitimacy. Legality and legitimacy
diverge in crisis conditions, and the divergence causes courts to assume a restrained role.
We take up these points in turn.
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The timing of review. A basic feature of judicial review in most Anglo-American
legal systems is that courts rely upon the initiative of private parties to bring suits, which
the courts then adjudicate as “cases and controversies” rather than as abstract legal
questions. This means that there is always a time lag, of greater or lesser duration,
between the adoption of controversial government measures and the issuance of judicial
opinions on their legal validity. Common lawyers sometimes praise this delayed review
precisely because the delay ensures that courts are less likely to set precedents while
crises are hot, precedents that will be warped by the emotions of the day or by the
political power of aroused majorities.84
Delayed review has severe costs, however. For one thing, courts often face a fait
accompli. Although it is sometimes possible to strangle new programs in the crib, once
those measures are up and running, it is all the more difficult for courts to order that they
be abolished. This may be because new measures create new constituencies or otherwise
entrench themselves, creating a ratchet effect,85 but the simpler hypothesis is just that
officials and the public believe that the measures have worked well enough. Most simply,
returning to the pre-emergency status quo by judicial order seems unthinkable; doing so
would just re-create the conditions that led the legislature and executive to take
emergency measures in the first place.
For another thing, even if courts could overturn or restrict emergency measures,
by the time their review occurs, those measures will by their nature already have worked,
or not. If they have worked, or at least if there is a widespread sense that the crisis has
passed, then the legislators and public may not much care whether the courts invalidate
the emergency measures after the fact. In the case of the EESA, one legal question we
have discussed is whether the statute vests the Secretary of the Treasury with so much
legal authority, without intelligible standards, as to violate the somewhat spectral
“nondelegation doctrine.” Although the legal claim is not intrinsically strong, the more
important point is that by the time the courts issue a final pronouncement on the
challenge, the program will either have increased liquidity and stabilized financial
markets, or not. In either case, the nondelegation challenge will interest constitutional
lawyers, but will lack practical significance.
Intensity of review. Another dimension of review is intensity rather than timing.
At the level of constitutional law, the overall record is that courts tend to defer heavily to
the executive in times of crisis, only reasserting themselves once the public sense of
imminent threat has passed.86 At the level of administrative law, as to security matters,
84

See Cole, supra note 60, at 2575-76; DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A
TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006). See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
85
For skepticism about these and related possibilities, see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 131-56.
86
Although we cannot document the assertion here, for a full treatment, see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra
note 2.

29

federal courts deciding cases after 9/11 have tended to defer in a range of important
cases,87 although more large-number work is necessary to understand the precise contours
of the phenomenon. Schmitt occasionally argued that the administrative state would
actually increase the power of judges, insofar as liberal legislatures would attempt to
compensate for broad delegations to the executive by creating broad rights of judicial
review;88 consider the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which postdates Schmitt’s
claim. It is entirely consistent with the broader tenor of Schmitt’s thought, however, to
observe that the very political forces that constrain legislatures to enact broad delegations
in times of crisis also hamper judges, including judges applying APA-style review. While
their nominal power of review may be vast, the judges cannot exercise it to the full in
times of crisis.
Deference to executives in administrative-law cases can arise in two ways. In the
first, administrative law creates a “black hole” in which there is no review at all. In the
second, courts applying flexible standards of review, such as the “arbitrary and
capricious” test that is a central feature of the APA, create a “grey hole.”89 In the latter
case, despite the nominal availability of review, courts dial down the intensity of review
in ways that are difficult for the Supreme Court or outside observers to check in
particular cases, although the existence of the phenomenon will be quite obvious in the
aggregate.90
In the framing of the EESA, the same two modes of deference came into play.
The Secretary’s initial proposal would have excluded review altogether. The final version
is best read to create standard APA-style review of the Secretary’s actions, if only to
avoid possible constitutional questions about nondelegation. Although, as we noted
above, there is some ambiguity about what review the statute actually allows, we will
indulge the assumptions least favorable to our view by stipulating that ordinary review is
permitted.
The problem with APA-style review under the EESA, however, is that, as in other
areas of administrative law, courts will predictably defer heavily to administrators’
particular decisions in times of crisis. Courts do so both because they lack the
information to second-guess those decisions in the complex circumstances of actual
cases, and because they fear to be seen to thwart emergency measures. Lower courts,
especially, are reluctant to challenge the decisions of the President and other high
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executive officials in matters of national security;91 quite plausibly, the same will be true
as to economic emergencies. And the questions at issue in such cases will generally be
too numerous and too fact-bound for the Supreme Court to review more than a handful of
them.92
Whether or not such deference is desirable in the abstract, the pragmatics of crisis
governance give courts few alternatives. Consider the idea that courts could review the
transactions the Secretary undertakes, in particular the prices he accepts at “reverse
auctions” for mortgage-related securities. If courts subject these transactions to
meaningful review, then sellers would be afraid that sales would be reversed, and the
whole idea of the program—to encourage holders of assets to sell—would be
undermined. If courts subject these transactions to highly deferential review, then review
would serve little purpose. In any event, it is doubtful that courts could second-guess the
Secretary’s pricing decisions. The problem is that the mortgage-related asset market has
collapsed, so there are no market prices to use as a benchmark. And given the likely
complexity of these transactions, which would involve equity stakes, covenants of
various sorts, and much else, courts would be in a difficult position if they sought to
evaluate the transactions in a serious fashion.
In general, the Secretary’s pricing decisions under the EESA are paradigmatic of
the types of questions that courts find it difficult to review, involving as they do a
combination of technicality, uncertainty about valuation, and urgency. The first two
factors are also present in judicial review of rate regulation of public utilities by
administrative agencies, which tends to be highly deferential; more broadly, the inability
of courts to determine utility rates and common-carrier rates, through a succession of
cases, was a major impetus behind the creation of early administrative agencies.93
Beyond the features common with other regulatory schemes in which uncertain valuation
is a problem, the EESA carries with it an aura of urgency, which will make courts
reluctant to be seen frustrating the only major statutory mechanism for coping with the
financial crisis.
The upshot is that the EESA will, in all probability, create nothing more than a
series of legal grey holes, rather than genuinely independent judicial oversight. Lawyers,
who are frequently obsessed with the formal question whether judicial review is
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technically available or not, may draw comfort from Congress’ decision to provide for
arbitrariness review. From another perspective, however, legal grey holes may be worse
than legal black ones. The former create an illusion of oversight, whereas the latter are in
a sense more candid about whether meaningful review will in fact occur.94 Our
perspective is that it is not useful to talk about whether black or grey holes are preferable.
Some mix of both types is inevitable where statutes like the AUMF, Patriot Act and the
EESA delegate administrative power to cope with an emergency. Background legalist
statutes like the APA are themselves shot through with exceptions and qualifications that
allow the standard pattern of crisis management to proceed without real check.
Legality and legitimacy. At a higher level of abstraction, the basic problem
underlying judicial review of emergency measures is the divergence between the courts’
legal powers and their political legitimacy in times of perceived crisis. As Schmitt
pointed out, emergency measures can be “exceptional” in the sense that although illegal,
or of dubious legality, they may nonetheless be politically legitimate, if they respond to
the public’s sense of the necessities of the situation.95 Domesticating this point and
applying it to the practical operation of the administrative state, courts reviewing
emergency measures may be on strong legal ground, but will tend to lack the political
legitimacy needed to invalidate emergency legislation or the executive’s emergency
regulations. Anticipating this, courts pull in their horns.
When the public sense of crisis passes, legality and legitimacy will once again
pull in tandem; courts then have more freedom to invalidate emergency measures, but it
is less important whether or not they do so, as the emergency measure will in large part
have already worked, or not. The precedents set after the sense of crisis has passed may
be calmer and more deliberative, and thus of higher epistemic quality – this is the claim
of the common lawyers, which resembles an application of the Madisonian vision to the
courts – but the public will not take much notice of those precedents, and they will have
little sticking power when the next crisis rolls around.
E. Other Oversight Mechanisms
In emergency lawmaking, Congress routinely attaches strings to its delegations in
the form of reporting provisions, sunset provisions, and a variety of other oversight
mechanisms. Such provisions often amount to less than meet the eye. Reporting
provisions – used in the AUMF, the Patriot Act, and the EESA – embody both a concern
that Congress should be informed and also an elevated theory that transparency will
promote democratic accountability. Yet in practice such provisions notoriously end up
leveling forests to create massive documents that few people ever read.
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Both the Patriot Act and the EESA contain sunset provisions.96 The main theory
of such provisions is that by creating a future reversion to the legal status quo ante the
delegation, the sunset will make it easier to claw back new powers from the executive if a
future Congress judges that the emergency has passed; the future Congress can do so
simply by declining to re-enact the new powers, rather than having to affirmatively
overturn them by a new statute, which could itself be vetoed.97 In practice, however, the
difference between emergency statutes with and without sunsets is often small, for
political reasons. When controversial provisions of the Patriot Act came up for renewal in
2005, the provisions were twice continued on a short-term basis while the administration
played chicken with Democratic and Republican civil libertarians in the Senate, betting
that legislators would not be willing to let the provisions lapse altogether. In the end,
minor adjustments were made, but the bulk of the provisions were re-enacted, some
permanently.98
The EESA follows a broadly similar pattern to the Patriot Act by creating
checking and monitoring mechanisms whose force is at best unclear. We will pass over
the statute’s reporting requirements and its sunset clause, to focus on two mechanisms of
greater interest. The first involves periodic review by Congress itself, the second involves
oversight by an independent board.
Congressional review. In the first mechanism, the EESA provides that the
Secretary’s last $350 billion (!) in purchasing authority is subject to a “joint resolution”
of disapproval.99 The theory of the provision is to secure review by a future Congress,
akin to a sunset clause (which the EESA also contains). Yet this mechanism requires
affirmative action by the future Congress, or at least a credible threat of such action; as
such, it seems even less likely than a sunset clause to result in a real check on the
executive. A joint resolution is just a statute by another name, so the disapproval would
have to obtain a congressional supermajority in order to override a veto. The provision is
not completely meaningless – for one thing, it waives complex internal legislative
procedures and thus places the disapproval on a fast track – yet this does nothing to cure
the basic problem. Similar statutes that require affirmative congressional action to check
the executive, such as the National Emergencies Act, have tended to become dead
letters.100 One may safely predict the same here.
Independent boards. The EESA also creates oversight by a putatively independent
board, the “Financial Stability Oversight Board,” which consists of the Secretary himself,
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the Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (an independent
commission recently created in other legislation), and the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development.101 Of these five, three are chairs or heads of “independent
agencies,” whose principals cannot be fired without cause, and this suffices to create a
patina of independent oversight. In the case of the SEC, there is some degree of legal
uncertainty about the independence of the commission, in part because the D.C. Circuit
recently issued an expansive interpretation of the grounds for firing permitted by the
statute.102 So one might describe the EESA as creating a Board consisting of two-and-ahalf independent agencies and two-and-a-half executive agencies -- another display of
Congress’ Solomonic wisdom.
However this may be, the aura of independence fades quickly when one considers
the Board’s powers and the actual conduct of its members. The Board is authorized to
“review[] the exercise of [the Secretary’s powers],” to ensure that the Secretary is
carrying out the purposes and policies of the statute, to recommend action to the
Secretary, and to send reports to appropriate congressional committees.103 These
provisions are another exercise in “studied ambiguity.”104 Their scope and force is vague,
the crux of the ambiguity being whether the Board has power to actually countermand the
Secretary’s purchasing decisions and other orders, or whether its power to “review”
simply amounts to a power to find out what the Secretary is up to and transmit
information to Congress. The highminded interpretation is that Congress declined to give
the Board clearly controlling authority because of lurking constitutional questions about
whether the powers of a “core” executive agency like the Treasury could be subjected to
independent control, even under the Court’s latitudinarian precedents.105 The lowminded
interpretation is that legislators benefitted politically by creating an oversight mechanism
whose atmospherics suggest independent supervision of the Secretary’s massive new
powers, but whose operational reality is far less impressive.
Even if the Board had crystal-clear legal power to actually countermand the
Secretary’s decisions, a separate problem is whether the Board would in practice function
as an autonomous check on the Secretary’s extraordinary economic authority. The answer
is likely to be no. Even before the EESA was enacted, the chair of the Fed, Ben
Bernanke, acted hand in glove with the Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, with the latter
in the role of lead partner. Part of the explanation here is that independent agencies face
the same problems of legality and legitimacy that plague independent judiciaries in times
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of crisis. Lacking a direct channel of accountability to the President, they are partially
insulated from politics, but are also vulnerable to criticism as “unelected bureaucrats.”
Moreover, recent empirical work suggests that the heads of independent agencies
and executive agencies tend to have common preferences and beliefs, both aligned with
those of the reigning President; at least this is especially likely to be so late in the second
term of an eight-year Presidency.106 If this is correct, it is because the growing
polarization of the political parties ensures that Presidents can reliably select and appoint
independent agency heads whose preferences and views track their own. While a Senate
dominated by the other party can slow down the rate of such appointments, and thus
delay the time when Presidents take control of the independent agencies, eventually
Presidents can do a great deal to coordinate all agency heads on common preferences and
a common program, whatever their nominal legal status.
F. The Self-Fulfilling Crisis of Authority
Finally, we mention a dynamic that further tightens the political constraints in
times of crisis. Precisely because markets expected the House to pass the EESA, its initial
failure to do so created a perceived “crisis of authority,”107 suggesting a risk that
dysfunctional political institutions would not be able to coordinate on any economic
policy at all. That second-order crisis supervened on the underlying economic crisis, but
acquired force independent of it. The Senate had to scramble to undo the damage and did
so in world-record time. The House quickly fell into line.
In this way, measures urged by the executive to cope with a crisis of unclear
magnitude acquired a kind of self-created momentum. Rejection of those measures would
themselves create a political crisis that might, in turn, reduce confidence and thus trigger
or exacerbate the underlying financial crisis. A similar process occurred in the debates
over the AUMF and the Patriot Act, where proponents of the bills urged that their
rejection would send terrorist groups a devastating signal about American political unity
and will, thereby encouraging more attacks. These political dynamics, in short, create a
self-fulfilling crisis of authority that puts legislative institutions under tremendous
pressure to accede to executive demands, at least where a crisis is even plausibly alleged.
Critics of executive power contend that the executive exploits its focal role during
crises in order to bully and manipulate Congress, defeating Madisonian deliberation when
it is most needed.108 On an alternative account, the legislature rationally submits to
executive leadership because a crisis can be addressed only by a leader. Enemies are
emboldened by institutional conflict or a divided government; financial markets are
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spooked by it.109 A government riven by internal conflict will produce policy that varies
as political coalitions rise and fall. Inconsistent policies can be exploited by enemies and
they generate uncertainty at a time that financial markets are especially sensitive to
agents’ predictions of future government action. It is a peculiar feature of the 2008
financial crises that a damaged president could not fulfill the necessary leadership role,
but that role quickly devolved to the Treasury Secretary and Fed Chair who, acting in
tandem, have not once expressed disagreement publicly.
*****
The basic similarity between the two episodes of emergency lawmaking, in 2001
and 2008, is somewhat obscured by the Sturm und Drang that accompanied the EESA’s
passage. Election-year politics exacerbated the political turmoil, but the Houses’ initial
rejection of the EESA resembled the revolt of civil-libertarian Republican back-benchers
in the debate over the Patriot Act, just on a larger scale. Broadly speaking, the final result
was strikingly similar: the executive got the core of its requested new power, with a few
oversight mechanisms of uncertain force, including a remote future prospect of judicial
review. Overall, the EESA, like the AUMF and the Patriot Act before it, exemplifies the
usual outcome of Schmittian crisis management, albeit with some important contextual
differences. We now turn to those differences.
III. Variations in Crisis Governance
The Schmittian view, even if correct, should not be understood to make point
predictions about how any particular crisis will be resolved. Rather, it supplies a
framework that helps to identify broad political constraints. What explains variations in
crisis governance, within the constraints? In this Part, we both detail the differences
between crisis governance in the two cases, and consider several explanations for those
differences.
Critics of executive aggrandizement objected more loudly in 2001 than in 2008,
but it is hard to measure the practical differences between the two cases. The executive’s
actions after 9/11 might seem more conspicuous and dramatic, but it is not clear that
those actions—immigrant sweeps, profiling, detentions, even war—were more extreme
than the government’s intervention in financial markets, which involved the nearnationalization of a multi-trillion dollar industry.110 The main differences lie in law and
rhetoric. After 9/11 the administration more clearly stretched or defied existing statutes—
109

See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 18671960, at 418 (1963) (“The detailed story of every banking crisis in our history shows how much depends on
the presence of one or more outstanding individuals willing to assume responsibility and leadership.”).
110
In the Financial Crisis of 2008, the Fed, for the first time ever, placed hard-to-value, questionable assets
on its balance sheet. See Posting of Paul Krugman to The Conscience of a Liberal,
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/ok-we-are-a-banana-republic/ (Sept. 29, 2008, 15:02 EST);
see also Posting of Paul Krugman to The Conscience of a Liberal,
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/demolition-accomplished/ (Sept. 26, 2008, 9:57 EST).

36

ignoring FISA and the anti-torture statute, for example—than it did during the financial
crisis, and it made more aggressive arguments about its constitutional authority. In the
9/11 crisis, it invoked the commander-in-chief and vesting clauses of Article II of the
Constitution; in the financial crisis, the Bush administration made no constitutional
arguments.
We examine four explanations of these differences.
A. The Madisonian View Revisited: Formal Law
One possible explanation for these differences reverts back to the formal legal
setting. On this theory, one set of legal rules governs security crises and another set of
legal rules governs financial crises, and the security-crisis rules give the executive more
authority to act unilaterally than the financial-crisis rules do. A variant of this theory is
that there are special security-crisis rules but no financial-crisis rules: the executive’s
authority in financial crises is no greater than its authority during normal times. Where
the Bush administration had adequate authority, it acted; where it did not, it sought the
necessary authority.
This account cannot be the whole story. On the one hand, the Bush administration
did stretch its statutory authorizations in both cases, perhaps violating some of them, so
as to engage in actions that it thought necessary, although there was an important
difference of degree. The NSA surveillance program and the administration’s
interrogation practices were in tension with statutes. The Fed’s bailout of AIG was as
well; the relevant statute authorized loans only, while the transaction was probably a
purchase. On the other hand, the administration sought Congressional authorization, in
both cases, for actions that it believed, or could have believed, were already lawful. The
administration probably did not need the AUMF in order to launch an attack on
Afghanistan, and it has never conceded that the statute was necessary. And the
administration, acting through the Fed, could probably have bought up mortgage-related
assets as necessary; it did not need statutory authorization to borrow, and could have
borrowed hundreds of billions, even trillions, of dollars in order to buy those assets or the
institutions that owned them.
In terms of formal written law, embodied in the Constitution and statutes, the
difference between the two types of crises is small. The U.S. Constitution, unlike many
foreign constitutions, has no explicit provisions for emergencies that give the executive
heightened power. It does have a rule that grants Congress the authority to suspend
habeas corpus during security crises only (rebellion or invasion),111 but Congress did not
use that authority during the 9/11 crisis. A host of statutes address security and financial
emergencies, but these statutes by definition embody Congressional authorization, so
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their existence cannot explain why the Bush administration stretched or violated statutes
to a greater extent during the 9/11 crisis than during the financial crisis.
In terms of constitutional practice, the story is more complicated. In nearly every
major war or security emergency since the founding, the executive has claimed broad
powers to respond—in some cases violating statutes, in other cases violating
constitutional rules that apply during normal times.112 Frequently noted examples include
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, Wilson’s crackdown on wartime dissenters, and
FDR’s internment of Japanese-Americans. These and other precedents have given rise to
a vigorous and controversial executive-branch jurisprudence of executive power that
draws on the commander-and-chief and vesting clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and
various judicial opinions that recognize the executive’s primacy in foreign relations.113
The Bush administration drew on this traditional jurisprudence in the course of justifying
its narrow interpretations of FISA and other statutes that stood in the way of its war-onterror tactics.
Precedent for emergency powers during financial crises is equally abundant.
Consider FDR’s first inaugural address in 1933, where he vaguely hinted that he might
need dictatorial powers in order to address the Great Depression:
It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority
may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be
that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for
temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure.
I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a
stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or
such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom,
I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption.
But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and
in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear
course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one
remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to wage a war
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were
in fact invaded by a foreign foe.114
FDR acknowledged that he would ask for, rather than seize, dictatorial powers. But the
request would come only in the event that Congress failed to cooperate in the first place,
leading one to wonder what might be the implied consequence if the request were turned
down. And even if Congress were to grant FDR dictatorial powers, there would be no
source for such a measure in the Constitution.
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However one interprets FDR’s address, Congress did cooperate with his
legislative program, so his constitutional theory was never tested. In addition, the Great
Depression in 1933 was far more serious than the financial crisis of 2008, which was
more like 1929, when credit had frozen up but layoffs had not yet begun, than 1933,
when a quarter of the workforce was unemployed, millions of people lived in
shantytowns and roamed the roads, and there were sparks of revolutionary anger. No
such conditions existed in 2008, so FDR’s speech does not offer even a weak precedent.
Therefore, the Bush administration had no basis for claiming unilateral emergency
powers to address a financial crisis.
Differences in constitutional law and practice, then, might explain why the Bush
administration acted more forcefully after 9/11 than during the financial crisis. A related
point is that Congress had delegated broader authority to address financial crises than
security crises. The Fed has enormous discretionary authority, as does Treasury, and the
two institutions had used that authority to intervene in the credit market and rescue
institutions long before the crisis of September 2008 occurred. By contrast, Congress had
given the executive less explicit authority to counter military threats prior to 9/11. It had
enacted a few emergency statutes with limited scope and it had acquiesced in much
overseas military activity without attempting to regulate it.115 But it had imposed
numerous constraints on law enforcement, intelligence, and military activities at home,
where the threat posed by Al Qaida would become manifest. Thus, the Bush
administration may have felt less need to claim constitutional sources of authority in the
financial crisis than in the security crisis.
As noted above, however, the legal differences do not adequately explain the
different approaches of the Bush administration to the two crises. It made aggressive
statutory arguments in both crises, and it did go to some trouble to obtain legal
authorization in the 9/11 crisis. A full explanation for the differences in approach must lie
elsewhere.
B. Magnitude and Nature of the Crisis
Another explanation for the greater aggressiveness of the Bush administration
after 9/11 than during the financial crisis is that the nature of the threat was different. On
this view, the security crisis posed a threat to life and bodily integrity and to the
economy, which depends on transportation and other facilities threatened by terrorists;
the financial crisis posed a threat to prosperity and financial well-being. 116 The security
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crisis did not have any real precedent and shattered expectations about how the
government can handle security threats; the financial crisis followed a long line of similar
cyclical downturns. The security crisis required a response that would necessarily involve
coercion and violence, including limitations on civil liberty; the financial crisis required a
response that involved no more than shuffling money around. In sum, the stakes were
higher after 9/11 than they were in 2008, and that explains why the Bush administration
acted differently in the two crises.
This theory has a number of vulnerabilities. The relevant consideration is not
whether the 9/11 attacks killed people or caused more economic harm than the failure of
AIG and other firms in 2008; the relevant consideration is what these visible events tell
us about the future. The 9/11 attacks implied further and possibly worse terrorist attacks
in the future, including a nuclear attack, but no one could assign a probability to these
worst-case events. The financial crisis implied further and possibly worse failures, with
the worst case a Great-Depression style economic collapse. Both worst-case scenarios are
major catastrophes; beyond that, little can be said about which set of events revealed a
greater threat to people’s well-being.
Moreover, while it is true that people have a visceral reaction to government
actions that infringe on liberties, this point cuts against the claim that the Bush
administration’s more aggressive posture in the security crisis can be explained by
reference to the nature of the crisis. In the view of the executive branch, the security crisis
necessitated a government response that involved violence; the financial crisis
necessitated a government response that did not involve violence. It was easy to
anticipate that people would be more concerned about the violation of civil liberties than
about increasing government debt. So the visceral reaction to infringement on liberties
should have resulted in greater caution by the government after 9/11 rather than less, and
hence greater eagerness to enlist Congress’s help, compared to the financial crisis. Yet
the opposite occurred.
Another theory is that the Bush administration needed Congress during the
financial crisis because ultimately only Congress has the authority to appropriate funds to
pay off the massive debts that the executive branch was incurred on behalf of the United
States; without a signal of congressional support, creditors would fear that the debt might
not be paid off, which would undermine the government’s efforts to calm fears and
reassure creditors. By contrast, military activity is the prerogative of the executive.
However, Congress would ultimately have to pay the bills for the 9/11 response as well.
In both cases, congressional support would strengthen the policies of the executive by
making clear that those policies would survive short-term political turnover; for this
reason, the executive rationally sought congressional support in both crises.
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In sum, differences in the magnitude and nature of the crisis do not explain
differences in the Bush administration’s responses.
C. The Psychology of Crisis
A recurrent theme in discussions of crisis lawmaking is the role of fear. A
standard account holds that during crises, public fear, or fear among legislators, causes
those legislators to put their faith in the executive, and hence both to delegate power to it
and to acquiesce when the executive claims new powers.117 Public fear during the 9/11
crisis accounts for the Bush administration’s unilateralism at the time; by contrast, fear
was muted during the financial crisis and hence the opportunity for exercising executive
power was more limited.
To evaluate this argument, we must start with the idea of fear. Fear is sometimes
used as a synonym for rational apprehension of a heightened threat, but in public debate
fear usually refers to the tendency to overreact in response to a threat, compared to some
baseline of rational action.118 Critics of the Bush administration believe that the public
would have been better off with a less aggressive reaction to the terrorist attacks but
supported the more aggressive action because of their fear.
Was there more fear after 9/11 than during the financial crisis? This question is
virtually impossible to answer. Certainly, fear was widespread after 9/11, and many
people stopped flying on airplanes, as a result. In the government, officials clearly felt
fear as well. During the financial crisis, the general public was less fearful, although there
was certainly a general level of anxiety. However, knowledgeable people—traders,
executives, government officials—clearly felt fear.119 Indeed, the common phrase
“financial panic” clearly signifies the role of fear in financial crises. A difference in the
level of fear does not have much explanatory power.
Both crises generated another emotion—outrage and a thirst for vengeance. A
crucial distinction is that during the 9/11 crisis, the outrage was directed (mostly)
outward, to Al Qaida members and their supporters who lived mainly in foreign
countries. During the financial crisis, the outrage was directed internally, at Wall Street
financiers and government officials. As a result, the 9/11 crisis generated (temporary)
political unity, while the financial crisis generated a populist backlash against the rich,
and division between the country’s elites and its public. It may be that the executive has a
freer hand when public unity exists than otherwise. However, it is not clear why this
should be so. If the public is unified, Congress should support the executive, in which
case unilateralism become less necessary.
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This brings us to our final point, which is the indeterminacy of theories based on
fear and other emotions.120 A threat to security generates fear; but the fear could be
directed at the external enemy, leading to a transfer of power to the executive, or the fear
could be directed at the possibility of executive abuse of its powers, leading to imposition
of limits on the executive, at least compared to the rational baseline. Similarly, a financial
threat could lead to fear of economic collapse, or fear of abusive government action that
exploits the crisis—leading to transfer of power to the executive if the first alternative is
correct, and the imposition of limits on the executive if the second alternative is correct.
Moreover, both effects could operate simultaneously, but in different directions, with
unclear consequences overall.
Still, we can see some merit in the following conjecture. The 9/11 security threat
generated fear of further attacks and outrage against an external threat, both of which led
to greater confidence in the government and especially the executive branch, which
traditionally has primary responsibility for repelling external threats. The financial crisis
of 2008 generated fear of economic collapse, but also outrage directed both at wealthy
elites and at the government that was supposed to regulate them. The distrust of the
government and the division among Americans partly explains why the executive could
not act as aggressively as it did after 9/11. We will develop this point in Section D.
D. Credibility and Popularity of Government Officials
Another theory is that the Bush administration could act more aggressively during
the 9/11 crisis than during the financial crisis because it was more popular and had more
credibility. People felt they could trust the administration with authority to engage in
operations that would often be secret by necessity; secret behavior, or behavior that is
based on hard-to-observe or hard-to-evaluate information, would also be necessary
during the financial crisis but the administration could no longer be trusted. This theory
rests on several important distinctions between the political and institutional context of
the 9/11 crisis and the financial crisis.
First, the Bush administration was more popular on 9/11 than it was in September,
2008. Bush’s approval ratings ranged from 50 to 60 percent prior to 9/11; they shot up
into the 80 percent range after 9/11. By contrast, Bush’s approval rating was in the 30
percent rage just prior to the financial crisis, and collapsed at its onset.121 A popular
executive can bully Congress; an unpopular executive cannot.
Second, the Bush administration was more trusted on 9/11 than it was in
September, 2008. In 9/11, the Bush administration was still an unknown quantity; it had
whatever trust an untried presidency has, marred by the controversial 2000 election. In
2008, the Bush administration had lost a great deal of its credibility as a result of its false
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statements prior to the Iraq War and various political scandals.122 The Bush
administration’s efforts to enhance executive power by making broad legal claims about
the basis of executive power in the Constitution backfired; whatever the merits of the
legal claims, people feared executive aggrandizement, and Congress and the courts
fought back by asserting their own institutional prerogatives.123 In late 2008, legal claims
resting on inherent executive power would have fallen on deaf ears.
Third, on 9/11 Republicans controlled the House and almost half the Senate; they
were in the ascendancy after a long period during which they had a subordinate position
in a divided government. In September 2008, Democrats controlled both houses and the
Republican brand had lost its luster. Although the 2008 Congress was extremely
unpopular—even more unpopular than Congress in 2001124—it also had greater
confidence in itself and greater reason to oppose the Bush administration, which would
accordingly need to act with greater care.
Finally, it was harder to blame Bush administration officials for 9/11 than for the
financial crisis of 2008. On 9/11, Bush had been in office for less than one year, so much
of the failure to prevent the crisis had to be attributed to his predecessor. In addition, the
9/11 attacks came out of the blue; it is not clear that they could have been foreseen and
prevented.125 By contrast, in 2008, Bush administration officials had been in office for
almost eight years. While the roots of the financial crisis can be found in decisions made
in the 1990s, regulatory oversight since then was the responsibility of the Bush
administration and it had failed.
However, there is an important countervailing consideration. So far, we have
referred to the Bush administration as the main protagonist, and this is correct for the
9/11 crisis. But the financial crisis involved a more complex institutional response. The
Fed is an independent agency and not directly under the control of the White House. In
addition, it enjoys a very high level of confidence. The Fed’s Chairman, Ben Bernanke,
was highly regarded. Indeed, the reputation of the Fed prior to the crisis in 2008 was far
more impressive than that of the Bush administration prior to 9/11.
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Bernanke probably believed that the Fed did not have enough resources, legal
authority, and political backing, to undertake the necessary response to the crisis by itself.
It did not have enough assets, and it would need the Treasury’s acquiescence in order to
borrow more. Its legal authority was expansive but probably not sufficient, and by
tradition it tried to limit itself to providing funds, rather than buying institutions or exotic
securities. In any event, it would have to cooperate with other agencies such as Treasury,
the SEC, and the FDIC, which had considerable authority over large parts of the financial
system, and these institutions could be coordinated only through the executive branch. So
the Bush administration’s lack of credibility hampered the Fed as well.
Cutting against these points, the Bush administration had a Nixon-in-China
advantage during the financial crisis of 2008 that it lacked in 2001. The lore has it that
only Nixon, a hawkish, anti-communist Republican, could establish diplomatic relations
with China because his conservative reputation rendered credible his claim that a
relationship with China served the national interest; a Democrat would be suspected of
being soft on national security.126 Generalizing, presidents can most assertively use their
powers in a way that cuts against the grain of the president’s ideological disposition.127
On this theory, Bush could not be trusted with military power because he was not known
as a civil libertarian, but he could be trusted with economic power because no one
thought he had any desire to nationalize the financial sector. As we have seen, however,
events do not bear out this theory, perhaps because Bush did in fact expand the federal
government during his two terms, and had already become known as a big-government
Republican.
To sum up, the weakened position of the Bush administration may account for its
less aggressive stance in the fall of 2008. The minimal public role of President Bush
himself supports this thesis. But Congress did not take up the slack. Leadership was
provided by a duumvirate consisting of Bernanke and Paulson, an awkward executive
branch-independent agency alliance, which, however, acted as one.
E. Voters and Cross-Border Effects
We noted above that the 9/11 attacks generated outrage that was mostly directed
toward foreigners, while the financial crisis generated outrage toward a subset of
Americans. Here, we expand on this point, focusing not on the emotional valence of the
response, but its political economy.
The response to the 9/11 attacks would necessarily involve coercion by security
personnel, whether law enforcement, immigration, or military. Such actions would
infringe on, or threaten, rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. However, the victims
of these actions would mostly be foreigners. Although the administration claimed the
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right to detain and kill Americans who belong to Al Qaida as well, this claim raised
hackles and was rarely acted upon.
By contrast, the response to the financial crisis would mainly take the form of
taking money from some Americans (taxpayers) and giving it to other Americans (those
with interests in institutions that own mortgage backed securities and related assets). In
the best case, taxpayers would gain more than they lose, but the best case was hardly
certain. Thus, actions taken to resolve the financial crisis would necessarily create
divisions among Americans. This may be why the Paulson bill, AUMF-like in its
simplicity, never stood a chance. The Dodd Bill and then the Senate bill that was passed
had hundreds more pages that ensured that the constituents of members of Congress were
paid off with dozens of transfers that were remotely or not at all related to the financial
crisis.
If the most plausible response to the 9/11 attacks would benefit Americans
generally, by enhancing security, and come at the expense of non-Americans, then it may
well have been rational for Americans to disregard traditional political checks on the
executive. Under the circumstances, it was less likely than usual for the executive to use
its enhanced powers against political opponents. By contrast, many if not most
Americans believed that any government response to the financial crisis would involve
redistributing wealth, and so they looked to Congress to defend their interests.
This story is appealing and may have elements of the truth. However, every
government action is redistributive; the 9/11 response had different effects on Muslim
Americans and on other Americans. It had different effects on people who lived in cities
and on those who did not, and on people who traveled on airplanes and on those who did
not. Complaints would soon arise that the newly created Department of Homeland
Security issued grants on a political basis. A powerful executive has as many
opportunities to make transfers among voters during security emergencies as during
financial crises. Accordingly, potential American victims of executive overreach existed
in both crises, and these Americans would resist executive aggrandizement in both crises.
Still, as a matter of public perception, the 9/11 response seemed more like a
traditional military response against an external enemy that had struck a blow against the
United States and posed a threat to everyone at home, while the response to the financial
crisis was not directed against an external enemy, but instead seemed to benefit foreign
and American financial elites who had harmed ordinary Americans and now stood to gain
from those same Americans’ expense.128 In the latter set of circumstances, the executive
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would need to work harder to reassure Americans that it acted in their interests, and
enlisting Congressional support was an essential aspect of this effort.
Conclusion
From our comparison of the two crises, we draw two conclusions. First, both
crises support the Schmittian view over the Madisonian view. Congress can neither
anticipate crises with statutory structures that provide the executive with properly limited
authority to address the threat, nor legislate after the crisis in a fashion that appropriately
regulates the executive. Beforehand, legislatures lack the information and motivation
needed to provide for the crisis in advance. After the crisis begins, legislatures lack time,
information, and the institutional mechanisms that are necessary for useful deliberation.
They can only provide broad support to the executive. If they do not, they can only make
the crisis worse. Rational legislators hold their noses and delegate power even when they
do not trust the executive and disagree with its ideological disposition or announced
policies. The broad delegations use vague standards that frustrate judicial review ex post.
Second, the executive will nonetheless have an interest in enlisting congressional
support. Congressional support can enhance the credibility of the executive’s policies.129
The Bush administration cooperated more with Congress during the 2008 financial crisis
than during the 2001 security crisis because the administration’s credibility had eroded in
the meantime and the public’s reaction to the financial crisis, which could be blamed on
some Americans, was more divided than its reaction to the terrorist attacks. Congress
acquiesced in both instances, giving the administration what it wanted but extracting
mostly unrelated transfers in return.
We have examined only two crises and it is dangerous to generalize. However,
the pattern of congressional and judicial deference to the executive during wartime
emergencies has been extensively studied and confirmed.130 A thorough study of
financial crises must await future work, but a few comments are appropriate here.
In the twentieth century, there have been numerous financial crises131 but two
stand out for their magnitude: the bank panic of 1907, when the stock market fell by 37
percent, and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 1907 bank panic was distinguished
by the absence of government leadership: the executive had no power to regulate banks;
Congress did not act either. Into this vacuum stepped J.P. Morgan, the leading investment
banker of the time, who arranged for a private consortium to inject liquidity into the
129
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banking system and stave off collapse. The lesson was not that private citizens could be
relied on or that next time Congress would speedily provide needed authority, but that
weak administrative institutions were unacceptable. Policymakers instituted a series of
reforms that led to the Federal Reserve System, which was given broad discretionary
authority to respond to financial crises.132
This turned out to be insufficient. The Fed dithered in response to the crash of
1929, and confidence was not restored until Roosevelt came to office, declared a bank
holiday, and compelled Congress to pass the Emergency Banking Act. (It took Congress
eight hours to pass this bill.)133 Although New Deal economic policies may have
exacerbated the Great Depression, Roosevelt’s charismatic leadership helped restore
confidence in the financial system and ensured that economic collapse did not result in
political strife as it did in so many other countries. New Deal legislation delegated
unprecedented power to the executive, and Roosevelt used it aggressively to maintain
order at home, despite an economic and political crisis that lasted a decade.134 The pattern
of a strong executive with primacy during financial crises was established, and it has
lasted to this day. It is the normal mode of crisis governance in the administrative state.
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